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Abstract 
Toby Walsh in “The Singularity May Never Be Near” gives six arguments to support his point of 
view that technological singularity may happen but that it is unlikely. In this paper, we provide 
analysis of each one of his arguments and arrive at similar conclusions, but with more weight given 
to the “likely to happen” probability.  
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1. Introduction 
In February of 2016 Toby Walsh presented his paper “The Singularity May Never Be Near” at 
AAAI16 [23], which was archived on February 20, 2016 (http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.06462). In it, 
Walsh analyzes the concept of technological singularity. He does not argue that AI will fail to 
achieve super-human intelligence; rather he is suggesting that it may not lead to the runaway 
exponential growth. Walsh defends his view via six different arguments.  
 
Almost exactly a year before, on February 23, 2015, Roman Yampolskiy archived his paper “From 
Seed AI to Technological Singularity via Recursively Self-Improving Software”[28] 
(http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.06512) which was subsequently published as two peer-reviewed papers 
at AGI15 [26, 29]. In it, Yampolskiy makes arguments similar to those made by Walsh, but also 
considers evidence in favor of intelligence explosion. Yampolskiy’s conclusion is that Singularity 
may not happen but leans more toward it happening. In the next section, we present arguments 
from the original paper by Yampolskiy mapped to each of the six arguments given by Walsh in 
his work.  
 
2. Contrasting Yampolskiy’s and Walsh’s Arguments 
To make it easier to contrast arguments derived from On the Limits of Recursively Self-Improving 
Artificially Intelligent Systems [28] we use Walsh’s naming of arguments even if our analysis 
doesn’t rely on the same example (ex. No dog).  
 
Fast Thinking Dog 
Walsh argues: “… speed alone does not bring increased intelligence”, and Yampolskiy says: “In 
practice performance of almost any system can be trivially improved by allocation of additional 
computational resources such as more memory, higher sensor resolution, faster processor or 
greater network bandwidth for access to information. This linear scaling doesn’t fit the definition 
of recursive-improvement as the system doesn’t become better at improving itself. To fit the 
definition the system would have to engineer a faster type of memory not just purchase more 
memory units of the type it already has access to. In general hardware improvements are likely to 
speed up the system, while software improvements (novel algorithms) are necessary for 
achievement of meta-improvements.” It is clear from the original paper that performance in this 
context is the same as intelligence and as most of our intelligence testing tools (IQ tests) are time 
based, increased speed would in fact lead to higher Intelligence Quotient, at least in terms of how 
we currently access intelligence. 
 
Anthropocentric 
Walsh argues: “… that human intelligence is itself nothing special”, and Yampolskiy says: “We 
still don’t know the minimum intelligence necessary for commencing the RSI [Recursive Self-
Improvement] process, but we can [argue] that it would be on par with human intelligence which 
we associate with universal or general intelligence [13], though in principal a sub-human level 
system capable of self-improvement can’t be excluded [6]. One may argue that even human level 
capability is not enough because we already have programmers (people or their intellectual 
equivalence formalized as functions [18] or Human Oracles [24, 25]) who have access to their own 
source code (DNA), but who fail to understand how DNA (nature) works to create their 
intelligence. This doesn’t even include additional complexity in trying to improve on existing 
DNA code or complicating factors presented by the impact of learning environment (nurture) on 
development of human intelligence. Worse yet, it is not obvious how much above human ability 
an AI needs to be to begin overcoming the “complexity barrier” associated with self-
understanding.” 
 
Meta-intelligence 
Walsh argues: “…strongest arguments against the idea of a technological singularity in my view 
is that it confuses intelligence to do a task with the capability to improve your intelligence to do a 
task” and cites a quote from Chalmers [6] as an example - “If we produce an AI by machine 
learning, it is likely that soon after we will be able to improve the learning algorithm and extend 
the learning process, leading to AI+”. Yampolskiy says: “Chalmers [6] uses logic and 
mathematical induction to show that if an AI0 system is capable of producing only slightly more 
capable AI1 system generalization of that process leads to superintelligent performance in AIn after 
n generations. He articulates, that his proof assumes that the proportionality thesis, which states 
that increases in intelligence lead to proportionate increases in the capacity to design future 
generations of AIs, is true.”  
Diminishing returns 
Walsh argues: “There is often lots of low hanging fruit at the start, but we then run into great 
difficulties to improve after this. … An AI system may be able to improve itself an infinite number 
of times, but the extent to which its intelligence changes overall could be bounded.” Yampolskiy 
says, “… the law of diminishing returns quickly sets in and after an initial significant improvement 
phase, characterized by discovery of “low-hanging fruit”, future improvements are likely to be less 
frequent and less significant, producing a Bell curve of valuable changes.” 
 
 
 
Limits of intelligence  
Walsh argues: “There are many fundamental limits within the universe”, Yampolskiy outlines such 
limits in great detail “First of all, any implemented software system relies on hardware for memory, 
communication and information processing needs even if we assume that it will take a non-Von 
Neumann  (quantum) architecture to run such software. This creates strict theoretical limits to 
computation, which despite hardware advances predicted by Moore’s law will not be overcome by 
any future hardware paradigm. Bremermann [4], Bekenstein [2], Lloyd [12], Anders [16], 
Aaronson [1], Shannon [19], Krauss [10], and many others have investigated ultimate limits to 
computation in terms of speed, communication and energy consumption with respect to such 
factors as speed of light, quantum noise, and gravitational constant.” “In addition to limitations 
endemic to hardware, software-related limitations may present even bigger obstacles for RSI 
systems. Intelligence is not measured as a standalone value but with respect to the problems it 
allows to solve. For many problems such as playing checkers [17] it is possible to completely solve 
the problem (provide an optimal solution after considering all possible options) after which no 
additional performance improvement would be possible [14].” 
 
Computational complexity 
Walsh argues: “… no amount of growth in performance will make undecidable problems 
decidable” and Yampolskiy says, “Other problems are known to be unsolvable regardless of level 
of intelligence applied to them [22]. Assuming separation of complexity classes (such as P vs NP) 
holds [27], it becomes obvious that certain classes of problems will always remain only 
approximately solvable and any improvements in solutions will come from additional hardware 
resources not higher intelligence.” 
 
3. Response to Walsh’s Arguments 
In this section we provide novel analysis of all six arguments presented by Walsh and, via mapping 
provided in the previous section, revisit and critically analyze arguments made by Yampolskiy. 
 
Fast Thinking Dog 
The argument intuitively makes sense, since nobody ever managed to train a dog to play chess. 
However, intuition is no match for a scientific experiment. Animals have successfully been trained 
to understand and even use human (sign) language and do some basic math. People with mental 
and learning disabilities, who have been long considered a “lost cause”, have been successfully 
trained to perform very complex behaviors via alternative teaching methods and longer training 
spans. It is entirely possible that if one had thousands of years to train a dog it would learn to play 
a decent game of chess, after all it has a neural network very similar to the one used by humans 
and deep learning AI. It may be argued, that there is considerable evidence that language and some 
other capabilities are functions of specific brain structures that are largely absent from a dog. Thus, 
1000s of years of training won't cut it and one would need millions of years of evolution to get a 
human-level intelligent dog. However some recent research has documented that people missing 
most of their brain could have near normal cognitive capacity [8] and even significant damage to 
parts of the brain could be overcome due to neuroplasticity [9] suggesting that brain structures are 
much more general. To transfer an analogy to another domain, Intel286 processor is not fast 
enough to do life speech recognition, but if you speed it up it is. Until an actual experiment can be 
performed on an accurately simulated digital dog, this argument will remain as nothing but 
speculation.  
Anthropocentric 
The reason some experts believe ([3] - page 339; [11] - chapter 3) that human level of intelligence 
is special is not because of anthropocentric bias, but because of the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT). 
CTT states that a function over natural numbers is computable by a prototypical human being if 
and only if it is computable by some Turing Machine (TM), assuming such theoretical human has 
infinite computational resources similar to an infinite tape available to a TM. This creates 
equivalence between human level intelligence and a Universal Turing Machine, which is a very 
special machine in terms of its capabilities. However, it is important to note that the debate 
regarding provability of the CTT remains open [20, 5]. 
 
Meta-intelligence 
If the system is superior to human performance in all domains, as required by definition of 
superintelligence, it would also be superior in the domain of engineering/computer science/AI 
research. Potentially, it would be capable of improving intelligence of its successor up to any 
theoretical/physical limits which might represent an upper bound on optimization power. In other 
words, if it is possible to improve intelligence a superintelligent system will do so, but as such 
possibility remains a speculation, this is probably the strongest of all presented objections to 
intelligence explosion.  
 
Diminishing returns 
It is a mathematical fact that many functions, while providing diminishing returns, continue 
diverging. For example, harmonic series: 1+ 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 + 1/5 + … = ∞, which is a highly 
counterintuitive result, yet is a proven mathematical fact. Additionally, as the system itself would 
be improving it is possible that the discoveries it will make with respect to future improvements 
will also improve in terms of their impact on the overall intelligence of the system. So while it is 
possible that diminishing returns will be encountered it is just as possible that returns will not be 
diminished.  
 
Limits of intelligence  
While physical and theoretical limits to intelligence definitely exist they may be far beyond our 
capacity to get to them in practice and so will have no impact on our perception of machine 
intelligence appearing to be undergoing intelligence explosion. It is also possible that physical 
constants are not permanently set, but dynamically changing which has been demonstrated for 
some such physical “constants”. It is also possible that the speed of improvement in intelligence 
will be below the speed with which some such constants will change. To bring an example from 
another domain, our universe can be said to be expending faster than the speed of light, with respect 
to distance between some selected regions, so even with travel at maximum theoretical speed (of 
light), we will never hit a limit/edge. So, again this is another open questions and limit may or may 
not be encountered in the process of self-improvement.  
 
Computational complexity 
While it is certainly true that undecidable problems will remain undecidable, it is not a limitation 
on intelligence explosion as not a requirement to qualify as superintelligent and plenty of solvable 
problems exists at all levels of difficulty. Walsh correctly points out that most limitations 
associated with computational complexity are only problems with our current models of 
computation and are avoided by switching to different paradigms of computation such as quantum 
computing and some, perhaps not yet discovered, implementations of hupercomputation. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Careful side-by-side analysis of papers by Walsh and Yampolskiy shows an almost identical set 
of arguments against possibility of technological singularity. This level of successful replication 
in analysis is an encouraging fact in science and gives additional weight to shared conclusions, but 
in this paper we provide novel analysis of Walsh’s/Yampolskiy’s arguments which shows that they 
may not be as strong as initially appears. Future productive directions of analysis may concentrate 
on a number of inherent advantages, which may permit AI to recursively self-improve [21] and 
possibly succeed in this challenging domain: ability to work uninterrupted (no breaks, sleep, 
vocation, etc.), omniscience (complete and cross disciplinary knowledge), greater speed and 
precision (brain vs processor, human memory vs computer memory), intersystem communication 
speed (chemical vs electrical), duplicability (intelligent software can be copied), editability (source 
code unlike DNA can be quickly modified), near-optimal rationality (if not relying on heuristics) 
[15], advanced communication (ability to share cognitive representations complex concepts), new 
cognitive modalities (sensors for source code), ability to analyze low level hardware, ex. individual 
registers, addition of hardware (ability to add new memory, processors, etc.) [30]. The debate 
regarding possibility of technological singularity will continue. Interested readers are advised to 
read the full paper by Yampolskiy [28] as well as a number of excellent relevant chapters in 
Singularity Hypothesis [7] which address many arguments not considered in this paper.  
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